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Neuroethics: An Overview

Chemists can tell us how molecules interact and change according to
general principles rooted in physics. No surprise there—the relation between chemistry and physics is a textbook example of intertheoretic reduction in the philosophy of science. Beginning in the mid-twentieth
century, biologists began to explain the functions of cells in terms of the
molecules that make them up. This has been worked out in detail for
many cellular functions and in gist for the rest. Even those special cells
called neurons, with their special tricks of signaling and changing connections to one another, are being explained in terms of more fundamental physical and chemical processes.
While cellular neuroscientists are steadily ﬁlling in our understanding
of what neurons do and the molecular machinery by which they do it,
systems neuroscientists armed with computational models are showing
us how groups of these cells in combinations can do even more tricks.
The behavior of large ensembles of neurons can, in turn, be studied by
neuroscientists and psychologists by putting people in scanners, stimulating speciﬁc brain areas, or observing the effects of brain lesions. Perception, memory, decision making, and many other mental functions have
been associated with the activity of speciﬁc sets of localized populations
of neurons. At this relatively molar level of description, the brain’s operations can be linked upwards to psychology as well as downwards to
biology.
It is here, at this juncture between psychology and the natural sciences,
that neuroethics comes in. In principle, and increasingly in practice, we
can understand the human mind as part of the material world. This has
profound implications for how we regard and treat ourselves and each
other. It gives us powerful new ways to predict and control human behavior and a jarringly material view of ourselves. Neuroethics is the ﬁeld
that grapples with these developments.
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Chapter 1

1.1

A New Name for a New Field

Does the ﬁeld of neuroethics really need its own name, distinct from philosophy of mind or bioethics? Newly named ﬁelds evoke skepticism and
even disdain in the academic world, and some authors have questioned
whether there is anything fundamentally new in neuroethics besides the
name (Schick, 2005; Wilfond & Ravitsky, 2005). As academics we are
shocked, shocked by attempts to market academic work, and nothing
seems more like marketing than a brand name. But I have come to believe that the ﬁeld is distinct enough from other established disciplines
that a distinct label is warranted.
To be sure, virtually all bioethical issues concerning any organ system
or medical specialty have counterparts involving the brain, neurology,
and psychiatry. These issues, some of which will be discussed later in
this chapter, make up part of neuroethics and could easily enough retain
the label ‘‘bioethics’’ rather than form part of a newly designated ﬁeld.
They will have a familiar ring to bioethicists, and the principles and
precedents of bioethics have an important contribution to make toward
understanding these cases. But there is more to neuroethics than classic
bioethics applied to neuroscience. New ethical issues are arising as neuroscience gives us unprecedented ways to understand the human mind
and to predict, inﬂuence, and even control it. These issues lead us beyond
the boundaries of bioethics into the philosophy of mind, psychology, theology, law, and neuroscience itself. It is this larger set of issues that has
attracted so many new and established scholars to the area and earned it
a name of its own: neuroethics.
This book is an introduction to the ﬁeld of neuroethics, with an emphasis on the second type of neuroethical issue just described. Although
the more familiar bioethical issues are important and invariably acquire
interesting new twists when manifest in the context of neuroscience,
it is the relatively newer neuroethical issues that are most in need of
explication.
1.2

Understanding Neuroethics

What, speciﬁcally, do people need to know to understand these issues?
Based on my experience teaching neuroethics to undergraduates and
graduate students, as well as talking to people about it everywhere from
professional meetings to the local dog run, I believe that one important
body of knowledge is neuroscience itself. In each of the following ﬁve
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chapters, I have therefore tried to summarize the key ideas and ﬁndings
from neuroscience that are relevant to the neuroethical issues discussed
in this book. These include very brief overviews of neurotransmission
and psychopharmacology, the neural bases of emotional memory and
personality, principles of brain imaging, the neuropsychology of responsible behavior, and recent work on imaging consciousness in the
damaged brain. I have tried to identify the most relevant parts of neuroscience for understanding the neuroethical issues of each section and the
speciﬁc readings in particular. My hope is that this information will
ground the reader’s understanding of the neuroethical issues in real
science (as opposed to vague abstractions about smart pills and science
ﬁction scenarios about cyborgs) and might even inspire and embolden
non-neuroscientist readers to learn more.
If a grasp of neuroscience is one essential component of understanding
neuroethics, then an appreciation of the ethical issues is the other. By
‘‘ethical’’ issues I mean to include the full range of concerns regarding
the impact of neuroscience on the individual human person and on society as a whole, including the moral, legal, and policy implications of that
impact. My goal is not to deliver a comprehensive review of this subject
matter but to offer readers a representative sample of the most interesting
and well-articulated ethical issues and to give them a sense of the diversity and nuance of different perspectives on those issues.
Whereas neuroscience is largely a matter of fact, the ethical implications of neuroscience can be seen very differently by different people.
For this reason, the bulk of this book is made up of the writings of
others, in some cases abridged to highlight a speciﬁc neuroethical theme
within the author’s broader original topic. The ﬁeld of neuroethics has
some singular voices, and I wanted to let them speak for themselves
here. There are nevertheless commonalities and unifying themes among
the most opposed viewpoints presented here, and these are highlighted
in the chapters that precede each set of readings.
1.3

Classic Bioethical Issues in Neuroethics

The remainder of this chapter is an overview of the many and varied
issues of neuroethics, beginning with the relatively familiar or ‘‘classic’’
bioethical issues of neuroethics and concluding with the newer ethical
challenges posed by contemporary neuroscience. I characterize some
issues as classic bioethical issues because, although they involve neuroscience, the ethical issues are not fundamentally different from those
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arising in other branches of life science. That is, although the brain is
central to these issues, from an ethical perspective its role is not substantially different from that played by other organ systems in analogous situations. These issues are no less interesting and important for having
underlying commonalities with other issues in bioethics, as the examples
reviewed here will show.
The development of predictive tests for incurable neurodegenerative
diseases raises a variety of ethical concerns. For example, brain imaging
has enabled researchers to better understand vulnerability to Alzheimer’s
disease, mechanisms of disease onset, and treatment response. Positron
emission tomography (PET) scanning (see chapter 4), in particular, measures relevant brain function more sensitively than conventional behavioral tests of clinical dementia research. PET research has revealed
neuroimaging correlates of incipient Alzheimer’s disease, which in some
cases may herald the clinical onset several years in advance (Scheltens &
Korf, 2000). With the enthusiastic backing of PET scanner manufacturers, the medical community has been encouraged to consider using
this method as a diagnostic test in the differential diagnosis of patients
already showing signs of cognitive decline. In 2004, the U.S. government
agreed to provide Medicare reimbursement for such scans under speciﬁc
circumstances.
No one has yet proposed scanning asymptomatic elderly individuals to
predict future disease or mental status, but one can imagine numerous
motivations for doing so. For insurance companies, personnel departments, and even the individual himself or herself, prediction of Alzheimer’s disease would allow for more rational planning for the future. The
ethical question, of course, is what price this added planning capability.
The knowledge that one is bound to develop Alzheimer’s disease is a terrible burden, particularly as there is no cure. Although this dilemma
results from recent advances in neuroscience, relevant ethical analyses
have been developed by bioethicists working on the implications of genetic testing (Bell, 1998). The main ethical concerns are privacy rights
(should your insurance company or boss know the test results?) and
quality of life (what are the effects on patient well-being of knowing versus not knowing?). These are common to genetic and neuroimagingbased prediction.
Another important ethical issue raised by neuroscience is the safety of
some of its newly developed research methods. One such method is
transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS), which alters brain function using powerful magnetic ﬁelds. It is noninvasive in the sense that the mag-
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net remains outside the head, but the magnetic ﬁelds pass through the
skull and other tissue and induce electrical currents in cortical tissue.
For some applications, a single pulse (onset followed by offset of magnetic ﬁeld) is used, but more commonly repetitive pulses are used
(rTMS). The effects of TMS vary according to where the ﬁeld is focused,
its strength, and its pulse frequency and can either increase or decrease
cortical activity near the stimulation site as well as in other brain regions
to which the stimulated area projects.
The ability to target speciﬁc brain areas for temporary activation or
deactivation makes TMS a valuable research tool, and cognitive neuroscientists have embraced it (Sack & Linden, 2003). The impressive ability of TMS to bring about scientiﬁcally informative brain changes raises
the question: What other kinds of brain changes does it cause? Concern
about the side effects of TMS, especially rTMS, has accompanied its use
from the start. We now know that high-frequency, high-intensity rTMS
can provoke seizures, even in people with no seizure history, although
guidelines developed in the 1990s have succeeded in eliminating this phenomenon (Wasserman, 1997).
TMS also shows promise as a treatment modality for a variety of neuropsychiatric illnesses (Loo & Mitchell, 2005) and was approved in
2008 by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA) for the treatment
of depression in speciﬁc kinds of patients. FDA regulation of medical
devices is generally less stringent than regulation of drugs. This was all
too apparent, in the view of many, when the FDA in 2005 approved
vagal nerve stimulation as a treatment for depression based on extremely
weak evidence of effectiveness. Brain stimulation with TMS and with
implanted devices are among the most promising new therapeutic modalities, which lends urgency to questions of clinical trial design and the
approval process for devices. Safety, efﬁcacy, and regulatory controls on
brain stimulation are neuroethical issues, as they concern the way in
which society manages advances in clinical neuroscience, but their ethical, legal, and social dimensions do not differ substantially from those in
the evaluation and regulation of other biotechnologies.
A more widely used application of magnetism in neuroscience is functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). As will be discussed in chapter 4, this has been the workhorse of cognitive neuroscience research
since the 1990s, thanks to its ability to measure brain activity with a
useful degree of spatial and temporal resolution, without the need for radioactive tracers or injected contrast media. Current research involves
placing the human subject in a magnetic ﬁeld of strength 1.5 or 3 tesla,
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and all indications are that this is safe. Until recently, technical limitations prevented the use of stronger ﬁelds; they could be created only
across spaces too small to accommodate a human head. However, it is
now possible to scan humans at 7 tesla and higher.
Strong static magnetic ﬁelds can affect blood pressure, cardiac function, and neural activity. In addition to static ﬁelds, image acquisition
with MRI involves exposure to varying magnetic ﬁelds and radiofrequency ﬁelds, which pose risks that range from activation of nerves
and muscles to heating of tissue. Subjects in high-ﬁeld scanners sometimes report seeing lights as a result of induced currents in their retinas
and/or optic nerves. Although safety studies have suggested that such
effects are benign, little is known about the long-term effects of these
newer and more powerful scanning protocols.
As with TMS, high-ﬁeld MRI raises important questions about the
risks to which we put human research subjects. How thoroughly should
such methods be tested for safety before they are used in research with
humans? Who should decide? These are important ethical questions
that must be addressed as researchers push the envelope of brain fMRI.
However, they are not substantially different from questions regarding
the safety of new methods for studying any other part of the body. Although high-ﬁeld scanning is mainly of interest in the study of brain
function, the ethical issues it poses are not fundamentally different from
those surrounding any new scientiﬁc method that has potential risks and
beneﬁts and that is used in the study of any organ system.
Another bioethical issue that arises in connection with fMRI concerns
brain abnormalities found by chance in the course of research scanning.
fMRI studies generally include a nonfunctional scan of brain structure to
enable localization of the brain activity revealed by fMRI relative to the
anatomy of each research subject. The structural scans are of sufﬁcient
sensitivity and resolution that anatomic abnormalities and signs of disease
will often show up. This raises the question of what researchers should do
with these incidental ﬁndings. There is currently no universally accepted
procedure for dealing with incidental ﬁndings from research scans (Illes
et al., 2004). Of course, the ethical issues raised by incidental ﬁndings
from brain scans are not fundamentally different from those that would
be raised by imaging other organ systems. Indeed, one of the most relevant
legal precedents does not come from imaging at all but from testing of
blood lead levels. In 2001, a Maryland state appeals court decided that
researchers studying the effects of lead abatement should have notiﬁed
families of children with dangerously high levels of lead in their blood.
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The issues just reviewed are the most commonly discussed ‘‘classic’’
bioethical issues of neuroethics, but they are not the only ones. Most bioethical issues have some intersection with neuroscience. For example,
stem cell therapy has been the focus of much discussion in bioethics,
and therapeutic targets include neurologic diseases such as Alzheimer’s
and Parkinson’s diseases (Goldman, 2005). Future genetic technologies
for selecting or altering the traits of a child are likely to include mental
traits such as intelligence and personality, which are functions of the
brain, as well as other physical traits (Chapman & Frankel, 2003). Issues
of drug industry marketing, regulation, and safety are nowhere more relevant than with drugs for neuropsychiatric illness, as the chronic nature
of such illnesses make treatments more proﬁtable and questions of longterm safety more pressing (Antonuccio, Danton, & McClanahan, 2003).
1.4

New Ethical Challenges from Neuroscience

In contrast with the issues just reviewed, some neuroethical issues arise
speciﬁcally because the brain is the organ of the mind. Neuroscience is
giving us new, and in some instances very powerful, ways to understand
people and to control their behavior. Of course, nothing is entirely without precedent if one describes it in abstract enough terms. My point here
is simply that some neuroethical issues are relatively novel and emerge
primarily because of the very special status of the brain in human life.
These issues are the focus of this book.
One set of such issues emerges from recently developed technologies
for monitoring and manipulating the brain. It remains to be seen how
these developments will intersect with our strongly held beliefs about
the value of privacy, freedom, fairness, and responsibility. One of the
main tasks of neuroethics is to assess the likely impact of neuroscience
on these and other moral and cultural ideals. This requires a realistic
understanding of the capabilities of neuroscience as well as an awareness
of the ways in which society already compromises one ideal for the sake
of another (e.g., trading freedom for safety).
The use of psychopharmacology to change or enhance normal brain
function raises a host of neuroethical issues, discussed in chapters 2 and
3 and the readings that accompany them. These issues are not hypothetical; use of prescription neuropsychiatric medications by healthy persons
is at an all-time high. In addition to concerns about safety and distributive justice, which might belong in the ‘‘classic bioethical issues’’ category, neuropsychological enhancement raises profound questions about
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human effort and just deserts (did I earn my A if used Ritalin?) and personal identity (am I the same person off Prozac as on?).
Other new ethical issues arising from the application of neurotechnology include those posed by fMRI and other brain imaging methods. The
main concern in these cases is not with safety or incidental ﬁndings but
with privacy of thought. Unlike imaging other bodily organs, imaging
the brain reveals information about the mind. Researchers have found
imaging correlates of individual differences in personality and intelligence, which can be applied outside the research laboratory; for example, by employers and marketers. fMRI and other methods are being
adapted for lie detection and behavior prediction, which has attracted
attention from the intelligence and criminal justice communities. These
trends raise new questions about whether, when, and how to ensure the
privacy of one’s own mind.
Of course, to the extent that functional neuroimaging is not up to the
task of reliably delivering such information—and at present it is not—
another problem arises: The high-tech aura of brain images leads many
people to accept them uncritically. The danger is that people will be
judged based on wrong information about their personalities, abilities,
truthfulness, or behavioral dispositions. The neuroethics of brain imaging is the focus of chapter 4 and its accompanying readings.
Some of the most profound ethical challenges from neuroscience come
not from new technologies but from new understandings. Neuroscience
is calling our age-old understanding of the human person into question.
In place of the folk psychology with which we have traditionally understood ourselves and each other, neuroscience is offering us increasingly
detailed physical mechanisms. Personality, self-control, responsibility,
consciousness, and even states of transcendent spiritual experience have
become subjects of study in cognitive neuroscience. Much as the natural
sciences became the dominant way of understanding the world in the
eighteenth century, so neuroscience may be responsible for a kind of second enlightenment in the twenty-ﬁrst century, naturalizing our understanding of humanity and transforming the way we think about
ourselves. Such a transformation could help bring about a more understanding and humane society, as people’s behavior is seen as part of the
larger picture of causal forces surrounding them and acting through
them. But it could also reduce us to machines in each other’s eyes, mere
clockwork devoid of moral agency and moral value.
Although many people believe that, in principle, human behavior is
the physical result of a causally determined chain of biophysical events,
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most of us also put that aside when making moral judgments. We do not
say, ‘‘But he had no choice—the laws of physics made him do it!’’ However, as the neuroscience of decision making and impulse control begins
to offer a more detailed and speciﬁc account of the physical processes
leading to irresponsible or criminal behavior, the amoral deterministic
viewpoint will probably gain a stronger hold on our intuitions. Whereas
the laws of physics are a little too vague and general to displace the concept of personal responsibility in our minds, our moral judgments might
well be moved by a demonstration of subtle damage to prefrontal inhibitory mechanisms wrought by, for example, past drug abuse or childhood neglect. This has already happened to an extent with the disease
model of drug abuse. The implications of neuroscience for morality in
general and the law in particular are discussed in chapter 5 and the readings that follow.
Our intuitive understanding of persons includes the idea that they have
an essence that persists over time. The changes wrought by normal development and life experience are understood as elaborations on a foundational personal identity that is constant throughout life. We also have the
intuition that persons are categorically either alive or dead. Furthermore,
most people also believe that persons have a nonmaterial component
such as a spirit or soul. Yet none of these beliefs ﬁt with the idea that a
person is his or her brain. As physical objects, brains can and do change
in countless ways in response to injury, disease, drugs, and, less commonly but no less realistically, implants, grafts, and other surgical interventions. There is no principled limit to the ways in which a brain can
physically change and thus no immutable core to the neural substrates
of a person. How can this fact be squared with the notion of an enduring
personal identity or essence? As for life and death, there exists a continuum of levels of function linking the brains of fully living beings like you
and me, and those of indisputably cold, dead corpses. Legal systems and
religions have both grappled with the question of where to draw the line
between us and those corpses, in part because any particular place is
somewhat arbitrary. The standard medicolegal deﬁnition of death, which
can apply to a warm, breathing body, seems counterintuitive to most.
Finally, as neuroscience reveals progressively more about the physical
mechanisms of personality, character, and even sense of spirituality,
there is little about a human being left to attribute to an immaterial
soul. The incommensurate realms of personhood and brain function,
which ﬁgure indirectly in all of the neuroethical issues discussed in this
book, are the focus of chapter 6 and the readings that accompany it.
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